"Membership Series by Language Federation for the Socialist Party of America: Dues Stamps Sold by Month -- January 1917 to March 1919," by Tim Davenport (ed.). This document compiles and tallies complete dues information for 10 of the Socialist Party's 15 foreign language Federations as well as making use of incomplete statistics for the 5 others, drawing inferences from known statistics to fill in the blanks. It shows that far and away the largest Socialist Party Federation in the period was the Finnish, with a 1918 average membership in excess of 10,000; followed by the German (6150), Lithuanian (3,800), Jewish (nearly 3,800), and South Slavic (estimated at 2,300 in 1918 despite the disruption of having withdrawn from the party briefly in October over the question of the war). The figures show that in the 1st Quarter of 1919, the 15 language federations combined sold approximately 19,000 more dues stamps each month than they averaged during the previous year. This gain was not limited to the 7 federations summarily suspended by the National Executive Committee in May 1919, however, with the unsuspended Finnish Federation (+2,275), Jewish Federation (+2,450), German Federation (+1,800), Scandinavian Federation (+600), and Czech Federation (+450) accounting for nearly 40% of the total increase in the membership of the language groups in the period. The data shows a single gross dues anomaly among the suspended federations (March 1919 -- Ukrainian Federation) and potentially suspicious rates of growth in the 1st Quarter of 1919 in 2 others (Russian and Lithuanian). Dividing the sums of the Federation membership totals in the table into the known official paid memberships of the Socialist Party as a whole (1917 -- 80,379; 1918 -- 82,344; 1919-QI -- 104,882) provides the information that an estimated 44.2% of SPA duespayers were members of foreign language federations in 1917, 45.8% in 1918, and 54.1% in the 1st Quarter of 1919.

 

"Theses on Tactics: Adopted at the 24th Session of the 3rd World Congress of the Communist International, July 12, 1921." The Theses on Tactics adopted by the 3rd World Congress of the Comintern was one of the seminal documents of the early Communist movement in America. The proposals were drafted by the high-powered Russian delegation in consultation with the German delegation and were introduced at the Congress in a report by Radek. Following their adoption by the Comintern, the Theses on Tactics of the 3rd Congress were regarded as a definitive exposition of the "tactical problems of [the] struggle for the proletarian dictatorship" by the CPA. The Theses declare that world revolution would only take place as the result of a long period of struggle, during which capitalism would generally decay and the revolutionary proletariat would concentrate its energies. The most important task of the Communist movement in the current period is proclaimed to be "the attainment of decisive influence on the most important portions of the working class, in short the leadership of the struggle." The isolated propaganda party is disavowed and participation in the daily struggles of the working class through the trade union movement is endorsed. As for the United States in particular, one of "the most important countries of victorious capitalism," literally "everything" remained to be done, the document states. In the USA "the communists are still before the first and simplest task of creating a communist nucleus and connecting it with the working masses." The document notes that American capital was attempting to "crush and destroy the young communist movement" in an attempt to avert the "imminent dangers" of a radicalized labor movement. This "barbarous persecution" had forced the communists into "an unlegalized existence under which it would, according to capitalist expectations, in the absence of any contact with the masses, dwindle into a propagandist sect and lose its vitality." This effort at forcing isolation had to be countered most energetically, in the view of the Comintern. The pressing need for an overground Communist movement in America is asserted quite explicitly: "The Communist International draws the attention of the United Communist Party of America to the fact that the unlegalized organization must not only form the ground for the collection and crystallization of active communist forces, but that it is their duty to try all ways and means to get out of their unlegalized condition into the open, among the wide masses; that it is their duty to find the means and forms to unite these masses politically, through public activity, into the struggle against American capitalism." Parliamentary activity of the world Communist movement was to concentrate upon the "ruthless unmasking of the agents of the bourgeoisie"; trade union work was not to settle for building of the numerical strength of the union movement, but rather in developing amongst the unionized workers "the consciousness of the coming struggle." Only in this way would the Communist Party of each country "be able to fulfill its task when the time for drastic action will have arrived," according to the Theses on Tactics.

 

"For a Party of the Masses (The Struggle Against Sectarianism): A Statement on the Controversy in the Communist Party of America by the Central Executive Committee, in Answer to the Appeal of the 'Minority' Members...to the Executive Committee of the Communist International." [circa Dec. 1, 1921] This is the official response of the Central Executive Committee "majority" to the November appeal of the CEC "minority" (Ballam, Dirba, Ashkenuzi) to the Comintern, published as a special printed "bulletin" to the party membership as explanation of the factional crisis in the CPA. The document -- signed first by CEC member James Cannon, indicating some likelihood of his primary authorship -- is feisty and combative, charging Ashkenuzi, Ballam, and Dirba with the "unwarranted and indefensible action" of unnecessarily exposing details of the CPA's planned foray into legal political activity as a calculated means of sabotaging their implementation. The "minority" is charged to have repeatedly changed their position on "the all-important question of communist legal organization and activity" -- their claim of support "in principle" of legal political organization is asserted by the "majority" to be brazen and insincere. "Their pretended acceptance of the principle of legal communist political organization is accompanied by an intensified campaign to obstruct its actual realization in life. Their opposition now takes the form of open defiance of the Party discipline, an open appeal to the Party members to refuse to obey the decisions of the CEC. They accept the principle, they say, but they are willing to smash the party to pieces to prevent the APPLICATION of the principle." The claim of the "minority" that the "majority" sought the liquidation of the underground party is held to be without basis. "No communist can or should rely upon bourgeois legality, even in peaceful times," this statement of the "majority" affirms. The idea of the "minority" that only a portion of the underground CPA should be raised to the overground is dismissed as "ridiculous" -- an excuse for vesting authority over a brave and hardworking overground component in a cowardly, isolated, and sectarian underground component. Charges of the "minority" that the "majority" mishandled propaganda in the armed services, botched the structure of the legal press, allowed non-communist elements into the party, and had conducted a "crushing policy" is dismissed as hypocritical and without merit. "Their campaign of slander, disruption, and sabotage has failed to break the party. The split which they propagate cannot succeed," the CEC majority declares.

 

"Report of the Secretary of the Central Caucus to the National Conference of the Communist Party of America," by John J. Ballam ("John Moore") [delivered Jan. 7, 1921] Report of the head of the Central Caucus to the "Emergency Conference of the Communist Party" held in New York City during the first half of January 1922. Ballam ("Moore") gives a thumbnail history of the development of the Central Caucus. From the first days of the unified CPA, Ballam asserts that it was clear that "the CEC was going much further in projecting the ALA [American Labor Alliance] than was necessary for the establishing of legal machinery." A "conference of representative comrades" of the old CPA was called to discuss this situation. CEC member J. Wilenkin, a former activist in the Socialist Labor Party and supporter of increased overground activity of the Communist movement, was among those invited to this meeting, but he seems to have been put off by the proceeding and to have disavowed its authority. In Ballam's colored words, Wilenkin "definitely repudiated his obligation to his constituency, refusing to confer further with us or be bound by any decisions which might be made." The adherents of the old CPA were thus placed into a minority position on the 10 member CEC of the party. In August 1921, Max Bedacht returned from Moscow with what he purported to be instructions to transform the ALA into a full-blown legal political party. In response, an informal deliberative caucus was established, including delegates of the bastions of the old CPA -- the Latvian, Lithuanian, Russian, Ukrainian, and Polish Federations -- as well as the 3 members of the "minority" of the CEC (Joseph Stilson having joined Wilenkin and the former UCP members of the majority). This faction was formalized as the "Central Caucus" on Sept. 17, 1921, Ballam states, adding that this directing center of elected delegates held 15 regular weekly meetings thereafter, culminating in the convocation of the emergency "National Conference of the CPA" in Jan. 1922. Ballam states that it remained the task of the assembled delegates to determine whether they should continue the fight against liquidationism and factional "crushing" by the majority within the unified CPA or whether "reorganize the Communist Party" by "maintaining that the membership now affiliated with the Workers Party have in effect left the CP of A, and claiming before the EC of the CI that we are the only party in this country that can be recognized as the American section of the CI, and carrying our appeal from a possible adverse decision by the EC of the CI before the 4th World Congress of the Comintern, if necessary."

 

"Report of the CEC Minority [Ballam, Dirba, Ashkenuzi] to the Conference of the CPA." [Jan. 7, 1922] Official report of the 3 top leaders of the Central Caucus -- John J. Ballam (Secretary), Charles Dirba (Treasurer), George Ashkenuzi (technician for literature production, etc.) -- to the emergency "National Conference of the Communist Party of America" which the Central Caucus held in New York from Jan. 7-12, 1922. The report gives a lengthy and detailed summary of the development of the division on the CEC, noting that plans were adopted for the American Labor Alliance at the 4th meeting of the CEC (June 30, 1921), and that at that time former member of the old CPA J. Wilenkin went over to the 5 former members of the UCP on the issue of legal activity, while Joseph Stilson supported the former UCP in their efforts against the Lithuanian Bureau. Ludwig Katterfeld is said to have secured a "promise" that the ALA would not be transformed into a full-blown legal political party -- a promise which was "broken" as soon as Max Bedacht returned from Moscow and made his report on Aug. 11, 1921. On Sept. 1 the vote was taken on the CEC to transform the ALA into a legal political party, the motion passing by the typical 7-3 margin, Stilson having moved decisively to the camp of the CEC majority. The CEC minority seems to have lobbied local groups to demand an emergency convention to decide the matter, but these calls were "disregarded and suppressed by the CEC majority," according to this report. The appeal of the CEC minority to the Comintern to overturn this move to establish a parallel legal political party is detailed as well as a second appeal on the internal situation in the party; it is asserted that no sufficient time had passed to allow ECCI to receive and rule on these appeals. The CEC majority is said to be bent on liquidating the Communist Party in favor of a new legal organization including the participation of "Centrists" and to have engaged in a policy of factional "crushing" -- removing adherents of the underground party structure from positions as District Organizer and members of Federation Bureaus and replacing them with compliant factional allies. The CEC's demands that groups raise to the overground was fought by some units, the report indicates: "When, in response to the appeal of the CEC minority, branches refused to legalize until a decision by the EC of the CI upon this appeal, they were 'disconnected' without any investigation or formality, not suspended or expelled in accordance, at least in form, with the constitution." "The total of the suspensions, expulsions, and 'disconnections,' not yet completed at the writing of this report, must be nearing the 3,000 mark," the report of the CEC minority notes.

 

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REVISED EDITION

"Appeal of the Minority Members of the CEC of the Communist Party of America Against the Policies of the CEC on the Question of the Formation of a Legal Political Party in the United States." [Nov. 5, 1921]. ** Third Edition: provides exact transmission date, modifies footnote accordingly.** The formal appeal of the CEC minority (i.e. the Central Caucus faction) to the Communist International seeking a halt to the actions of the CEC majority's actions with regard to establishment of a legal political party. While stating their agreement with the notion of legal political action and their willingness to adhere to the final decision of the ECCI in the matter, this appeal outlines the case of the minority: that the CEC majority had misrepresented the position of the ECCI and Lenin himself on the Legal Political Party; that its action in forcing the entire underground party into the open legal organization would put it at grave danger of arrest and destruction; that the duplication of legal and underground personnel would inevitably result in liquidation of the underground organization; that the proposed transformation of the American Labor Alliance for Trade with Soviet Russia into a full fledged Legal Political Party was counter to the Unity Agreement joining the old CPA with the UCP in May 1921 and artificial -- as the ALA had no mass membership outside of the underground CPA; that the CEC majority had failed to call an emergency convention of the party to work out details of this drastic change of the party line, thus resulting in confusion and a lack of confidence among the rank and file in the party leadership; that major preparatory work among the working class needed to be done before any Legal Political Party could be considered. For good measure, a litany of the offenses of the CEC Majority on other matters are tagged on the end, ranging from botched opportunities for mass propaganda to apathy to engagement in a policy of factional "crushing" of the former members of the old CPA.

 

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