Farm Workers Struggle to Survive

By William Haywood

In the late 1960's, Walter Reuther and the UAW shamed George Meany and the AFL-CIO into strong support for the organizing efforts of Cesar Chavez and the United Farm Workers. If the embattled UFW is to survive the recent Teamster onslaught (see box on the UFW-IBT agreement) and the union-busting tactics of the California growers, history may have to repeat itself.

While the agreement worked out by AFL-CIO negotiators Paul Hall (Seafarers) and Joe Keenan (Electrical Workers), and Einar Mohn of the Western Conference of Teamsters, is a great boost to the Farm Workers, it should be kept in perspective. At best, the agreement will allow the Farm Workers to stop battling the International Brotherhood of Teamsters and get down to the serious business of taking on the growers. In this battle, Chavez still has to confront the deterioration of his own union, possible violations of the agreement by locals of the Teamsters and a growing coolness to La Causa in the AFL-CIO high councils.

Even if the leadership of the Teamsters is dealing in good faith with the Farm Workers, the growers will be more reluctant than Fitzsimmons and Mohn to repudiate the contracts. That means that the Farm Workers must return to the picket lines, the courts and the supermarkets to regain their contracts.

The UFW is not in a good position to take on those battles. Its membership, which once numbered 40,000 dues-payers at the peak of the harvest season, is now below 10,000. Some say far below 10,000. There is no way that the UFW can win back those members or fight the growers without significant amounts of money and manpower from the outside.

While the United Auto Workers pledged $10,000 per week to the UFW for as long as the strike lasts, that amount can not come close to meeting the enormous needs of the Farm Workers. And indications are that the AFL-CIO, which gave its affiliate $1.6 million last spring is not handing over any more. While committed to the UFW's survival, George Meany is reluctant to commit massive resources to the beleaguered union. There are many indications of the Meany-Chavez rift, among them:

- The departure of Federation organizing director William Kircher. It was Kircher who originally persuaded Meany of the need to aid the then United Farm Workers' Organizing Committee. Recently, Meany has questioned Kircher's frequent trips to the West Coast to work with Chavez. When the AFL-CIO President informed Kircher that he was not in line for the new, upgraded position as director or organizing, Kircher took a job with the Restaurant and Hotel Employees.

(Continued on page 2)

Dems' Faction Fighting Outlasts Reform Issues

By Jack Clark

The battle over delegate selection rules for the 1976 Democratic Convention continues, and if no one is quite sure what the fight is about, all parties to the dispute remain determined to bloody each other mercilessly.

After a summer of taking testimony from Party activists in six regional meetings, the Mikulski Commission on Delegate Selection and Party structure met in Washington September 21 and 22 to decide its next moves. And while the regulars are threatening to ignore the 1972 Convention mandate, and the reformers are threatening to take the Party into a court battle, and the press is drawing the wrong conclusions on who's who, some of the substantive disagreements between factions on the Commission seem to be melting into the possibilities for reasonable compromise.

The New York Times, the Washington Post and the wire services all played up the factional role played by AFL-CIO COPE (Committee on Political Education) Director Al Barkan. But members of the COPE staff reportedly expressed agreement on compromise proposals advanced by the reform elements in the labor movement. Although Barkan pressed his factional role to the limit on procedural motions, the labor caucus meetings on the commission (which included "insiders" who took the Meany-Barkan line on neutrality in 1972 and prominent unionists who

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Farm Workers...

(Continued from page 1)

With his departure, the UFW is left without a staunch backer among the Federation’s top staff.

- Although Chavez insists that he is not seeking more money from the AFL-CIO, the fact is that Meany met with him prior to the summer meeting of the Federation’s Executive Board to tell him that no funds would be forthcoming. UFW Vice President Dolores Huerta remained in Oak Brook, Ill., the site of the meeting, hoping to arrange a gift or loan from some international unions. Neither was offered.

- The American Federation of Teachers at its August Convention gave Chavez a rousing welcome. But when it came around to a vote on giving him money, the teachers decided that the AFL-CIO and their own union had done enough already. Teachers close to powerful AFT Vice President Albert Shanker led the fight against more money. A collection on the floor netted $1600, hardly a major sum.

- When the UFW held its own Convention in August, both Meany and his second in command, Lane Kirkland, were conspicuous by their absence.

Meany, for his part, is not convinced that Chavez runs an acceptable union in the traditional sense. He is outspoken about some UFW policies.

“I am completely satisfied that he had to get rid of the labor contractors—the padrone system—there is no question about that,” Meany said recently. “But getting rid of that and not improving the actual conditions of hiring of his workers is not good... I think a great deal of this comes from the fact that the Farm Workers haven’t got a background in the trade union movement.”

Meany has had some talks with Chavez about the hiring hall. Both agreed that one of the worst things the Teamsters were doing was reviving the labor contractor. Chavez has promised to improve his hiring hall setup and eliminate favoritism.

Meany also sharply castigates the practice of pre-payment of dues by UFW members. He rightly points out that farm work is seasonal and not every worker follows the crops. Some workers, due to family conditions, for example, can work in a certain area for three or four months. They might not be able to work up north. The next year they are told they are behind in their dues and they would have to pay up before they can go to work.

“To me,” Meany says, “that is indefensible. I have told that to Cesar Chavez. The way the average union works, if a man is delinquent in dues, you give him an opportunity to work until he can get some money before you demand that he pay up.”

Chavez has acted on these complaints by Meany. At the recent UFW Convention, the practice of pre-payment of dues was abolished, and basic improvements in the hiring hall system were approved.

There are other aspects of the Farm Workers’ movement that experienced unionists believe Chavez will have to alter if he is to win back solid support from the AFL-CIO.

The cause of the Farm Workers has been a rallying point for many individuals and groups, some with off-beat axes to grind. On more than one occasion they have embarrassed Chavez. A huge portrait of Nasser was carried in the funeral procession for a 24-year-old Arab immigrant from Yemen who was killed in the strike. An article found its way into a recent issue of El Malcriado critical of the leadership of the UAW, a union which has extended strong support to the Farm Workers. The UFW tried desperately, later, to withdraw the issue from circulation.

The boycott of non-UFW produce, which the union is trying to develop, has little chance for success. The grape boycott was probably the most effective consumer boycott ever undertaken. It was a single, identifiable item which millions of Americans viewed as a luxury. Although vast numbers of trade unionists are still sympathetic to the UFW, there are millions inside and outside the labor movement who are now indifferent. Many of its supporters have sought other fields to conquer or have just dropped out.

Chavez, for all of his spirit and dedication, understands the harsh reality. Despite the support he has from people of good will, and despite the relief which a settlement with the Teamsters can bring, only substantial aid, in money and personnel, will enable him to fight the intransigent growers intent on smashing any legitimate union in the fields.

William Hayward is a seasoned observer of the labor movement.

Boycott Lettuce, Grapes & Gallo Wine

Sept. 29—Few details of the agreement between the AFL-CIO and the Teamsters are available as of today. Chavez has announced that the agreement will mean that the Teamsters withdraw entirely from the fields and leave the representation of field hands to the Farm Workers.

The agreement also reportedly calls for all conflicts between the two unions to be arbitrated by Meany and Fitzsimmons. So, it is still not clear whether Fitz has decided to get out entirely from the UFW’s jurisdiction. For his part, Meany, despite serious reservations about a massive commitment of the Federation’s resources to Chavez’ union, remains solidly committed to the continued existence of the United Farm Workers, and he can be relied on to represent UFW interests in disputes with Fitzsimmons.

—W. H.
U.S. Capitalism: Partner in Chile’s Junta

By Michael Harrington

The United States actively helped to destroy democracy in Chile. That, as will be seen, is not speculation. It is a fact which can be documented from the public record.

This does not mean that CIA agents were responsible for the coup, or that they played a major role in it. That may, or may not, be the case. It does mean that, even without the intervention of a single spy, the United States government followed a systematic policy of creating the economic conditions in Chile which would lead to armed counter-revolution. The New York Times editorial which, having argued that the CIA was not decisive in these events, thereby concluded that “on the known record, Washington had only the most peripheral responsibility in the downfall of Allende,” is uninformed, malicious nonsense. The “known record” is remarkably explicit on how Washington labored to subvert Chilean democracy.

The basic American tactic was well defined by Salvador Allende himself in his December 4, 1972, speech to the United Nations. It sought, he said, “to cut us off from the world, to strangle our economy and paralyze trade in our principal export, copper, and to deprive us of access to sources of international financing.” Eventually that strategy succeeded in helping to promote a fascist rising against Allende’s democratically elected government.

There are criticisms which can be made of Allende’s tactics and particularly of the role of the ultra-Lefts from the Altamirano wing of the Socialist Party and from the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR). This is not the time to detail them. This is the time to understand America’s despicable role in destroying a democratic movement which, whatever its faults, was the hope of the Chilean people.

Allende came in first in a three-way race for the Presidency—with 36.3% of the vote—on September 4th, 1970. Prior to the election, the Nixon Administration said that Allende’s victory would lead to “some kind of Communist regime, create massive problems for the United States and for the democratic forces in the hemisphere.” Contrary to normal diplomatic procedure, Nixon did not greet Allende on his election.

Between September 4th and the ratification of Allende’s victory by the Chilean Congress on October 24th, ITT attempted to rally Washington to a secret campaign on behalf of the Rightist candidate, Jorge Alessandri, who had received 35.9% of the vote. The Administration, however, refused to accept the ITT offer of 1 million dollars for subversive activity in Chile. (The information on these matters was developed in testimony before Senator Frank Church’s

Senate Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations.)

At this point, enter William Broe, the head of CIA’s clandestine operations in Latin America. When Broe rejected ITT’s crass proposals for buying the election, he countered with what eventually became American policy: a proposal for the economic disruption of Chile. At first, ITT balked at Broe’s plan and for a while American policy toward Chile was one of sullen, passive hostility.

Then on April 4th, 1971, the new President Allende strengthened his political hand: the Unidad Popular (UP) received 49.75% of the votes in the municipal elections. On July 11th, the Chilean Congress voted unanimously for the nationalization of the copper industry. The Right and the Army approved; the law was signed in the presence of the Cardinal of Santiago.

It was in response to this action—which had the support of the entire Chilean nation—that the United States began to move. On August 13th, 1971, this country cut certain lines of credit to Chile on the basis of the Hickenlooper Amendment. One of the most enthusiastic proponents of that amendment had been none other than Harold Geneen, the world’s highest paid executive and president of ITT. During this period, ITT was secretly trying to double-cross the copper executives (as it had previously sold out its corporate comrades in Peru) and to make a deal with Allende. Then, in September of 1971, the negotiations broke down and Allende “intervened” (took over preparatory to nationalizing ITT in Chile). Then Geneen and company were won over to Broe’s strategy for creating economic chaos.

As the ITT memo of September 30, 1971 put the concept of “silent pressure” on Chile, there would be a “drying up of aid, and instruction to the U.S. representatives in the international bank to vote against, or abstain from voting on, Chilean loans.” And discontent was to be fomented in the Chilean military. Geneen communicated these views to Pete Peterson, Nixon’s assistant for international economic affairs, and to Major General Alexander Haig, then Kissinger’s deputy.

At this point, in the fall of 1971, a dispute broke
out within the Administration. The hard-liners were led by Treasury Secretary John Connally. Their tactic was for a complete and automatic cut-off of all American aid and loans whenever a foreign government would expropriate, or not pay "appropriate" compensation to, an American corporation. The soft-liners included Kissinger and the Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs, Charles Meyer. In this fight, Connally had a particularly strong position. He was chairing the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Trade Policy which coordinates the policies of the American representatives on the International Monetary Fund, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Export-Import Bank, etc.

Throughout this period, Connally's people in the international financial community, public and private, were already following the tough line. In August, 1971, the Ex-Im Bank notified Chile that it would no longer be eligible for loans and that loan guarantees to U.S. companies doing business in Chile were suspended. The Inter-American Development Bank turned down a $30 million loan for a petro-chemical center. AID cut off funds to Chile as soon as Allende took over—although it gave $30 million to Bolivia in 1971 after the Hugo Banzer coup in that country. The World Bank provided no loans for Chile after 1970; the Overseas Private Investment Corporation refused to insure companies in Chile; and on and on.

In part these actions were rationalized because Chile's national debt was very high. But most of that debt—some $3 billion—had been inherited by Allende from his Christian Democratic predecessor, Eduardo Frei. In 1966, a U.S. Senate study told that 40% of official investment in Chile had been financed by foreign credit. Frei would have had to pay no less than 40% of Chile's foreign exchange earnings just to service this debt and he borrowed heavily to pay off earlier borrowings. In 1965-66 AID financed 14% of the entire Chilean budget and 30% of available foreign exchange went to paying off the charges on the previous debt.

Under Frei, GNP had increased by only 2.5% a year, hardly more than population. There were 232,000 unemployed in greater Santiago alone, 21% of the area labor force, when Frei left office. Foreign capital controlled 80% of the chemical industry, 50% of metals and 43% of food. In 1971, Allende's policy of freezing prices and increasing the buying power of the poor and the workers succeeded remarkably well. GNP rose by 8.5%, 260,000 new jobs were generated and inflation fell from 35% in 1970 to 22% in 1971.

But the flight of the Chilean bourgeoisie and a strike of capital (which refused to take advantage of the favorable situation Allende had created for the private sector) reinforced the pressures coming from American economic policy in 1971.

The real turning point, however, came in January, 1972. Richard M. Nixon joined the ITT-Connally camp. On January 19th, Nixon announced that "when a country expropriates a significant U.S. interest without making reasonable provisions for such compensation to U.S. citizens, the U.S. will not extend new bi-

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**World Socialists Strongly Denounce Overthrow of Allende**

"Whoever has condemned the persecution of Sakharov cannot remain silent in the face of the events in Chile. It is our duty to protest in both cases; if not, there is no moral right of protest."

—Bruno Kreisky, Socialist Chancellor of Austria

"On the Moneda Square, under Allende's window, one evening in Santiago, I bought the largest newspaper in Chile, the property of the largest banker, which had a banner headline 'Salvador Allende, Crook.' There were no prosecutions for 'offenses against the head of state.' Freedom of the press! Two of the three TV channels belonged to opposition parties which used them to incite violence. One of them had been closed for several months, but this week Allende had authorized its reopening. One will debate later on what could have been in relation to what was. One will total up the successes and the failures. But on this day of mourning, I believe that, if there are other riches beyond gold and power, the world is poorer."

—François Mitterrand, leader of the Socialist Party of France

As these statements indicate, world socialist reaction to the Chilean coup has been sharply stated and unambiguous in support of the Popular Unity government.

On September 12, speaking for the Socialist International, Chairman Bruno Pitterman and General Secretary Hans Janitschek said: "The Socialist International views with shock and abhorrence the recent developments in Chile which are the result of a continued campaign by reactionary and imperialist forces inside and outside of Chile against the lawfully established government of President Salvador Allende... this democratically elected socialist President and his Popular Unity government, against tremendous odds and relying only on themselves, fought for three years to create a united, democratic and socialist society."

On September 22, an extraordinary meeting of the SI's Bureau reiterated these sentiments, established an International Solidarity Fund for victims of the coup and commissioned a delegation of socialists from the leading social democratic and labor parties to go to Santiago on September 30.
lateral economic benefits to the expropriating country..." There was a concession to the "doves" at State and the NSC: the United States would not move automatically if there were "major factors affecting U.S. interests which require continuance of all or part of these benefits." But the signal had been given and it was the Treasury, not the State Department, which took charge of American policy toward Chile. Nixon publicly proclaimed that America "would withhold its support from loans under consideration in multinational development banks."

Allende responded to this attack in a forceful and convincing manner. Chile, he said, had paid the copper giants $4 billion over 42 years on an original investment of $30 million. "In my country," he told the UN in December, 1972, "there are 600,000 children who will never be able to enjoy life in a normal human way because during the first eight months of life they did not receive the minimum amount of protein. Four billion dollars would completely transform Chile." And Congressman Harrington reports that between 1953 and the present, American corporations in Chile took out more than $1 billion in profits—and invested only $71 million.

Moreover, the copper companies were trying to charge Chile double on some of the items in dispute. As Allende told the UN, the copper companies had "borrowed" from their own parent companies in the United States—to the tune of $727 million during the Sixties—in order to finance investment in Chile. After nationalization, they wanted to be paid for the value of the invested capital and for the debt which had paid for it (this is a variant of what economists call "transfer pricing"). Allende was actually paying off on the debt; to have compensated for what the debt had "bought" would be to pay twice.

Richard Nixon was not impressed. The Chilean people, however, were. In March of 1972 Allende's coalition received 43.3% in a nationwide vote, i.e. Unidad Popular had substantially increased its strength and was in sight of a majority when it was overthrown. (In Chilean politics, the undeviating tradition has been for the party in power to lose in off-year elections. Allende's coalition reversed that.) But America continued the economic offensive throughout 1972, blocking Chile at every turn. In October of that year, Dutch and Canadian private banks cut off credit. The Russians, who were quite wary of Allende's democratic road (and also suspicious of the ultra-Lefts in his coalition) promised $265 million in credits but actually were somewhat more generous with the military in Argentina than with the Left in Chile.

There is another interesting angle to the Russian coolness to Allende. The Soviets are primarily concerned with making deals with multi-national corporations in order to benefit from their technology (Jeremie M. Gvishiani, Deputy Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers for Science and Technology lauded the multinationals in a speech to 650 leading capitalists at the International Industrial Conference last month). As the Financial Times put it after Allende's UN speech, "as Pepsi-Cola disappears from the supermarkets in Santiago, it will become available to buyers in Moscow."

In any case, Chile, a nation which, through no fault of its own, had to live on credit, dropped from $220 million credit in 1971 to $35 million in 1972. The United States, which was the architect of this reality,
made one exception in its policy: it continued to supply generous assistance to the Chilean military.

I do not for a moment want to suggest that this evidence proves that American economic warfare against Chile was solely responsible for the destruction of democracy in that country. The indigenous counter-revolutionary forces were, and are, obviously quite strong (and they were aided more than a little by the treachery of the Christian Democrat, Eduardo Frei, who refused to do anything to support the cause of constitutional government in his homeland and even campaigned among European bankers against loans to Chile). Indeed, the New York Times recently reported that the Rightists in the army were delighted with Allende’s electoral victory of last spring. One officer told of a “sigh of relief when the Marxists received such a high vote because we felt that no politician could run the country and eventually the Marxist vote might even be stronger.”

The Rightists, in short, wanted chaos, and they conspired with the businessmen and the truckers to get it. America was on their side. Bore’s CIA scenario of 1970 became official American policy, admitted in Presidential directives and carried out with enthusiasm by the then Secretary of the Treasury. Just as we sided with the Pakistanis against Bangladesh, so we joined hands with fascist reaction against a democratic Government in Chile.

Does this prove, as some on the Left already argue, that there is no peaceful road to socialism possible? I think not. One knew in advance that an attempt to build socialism in a small, relatively poor country, dependent for foreign exchange on a single export and extremely vulnerable to attack by international finance, both private and public, was extremely problematic. But what if there had been a government of the democratic Left in Washington? Not a socialist government, which is hardly likely in the foreseeable future, but a decent government of the liberal Left. That would not have made it simple for Chile to overcome the disadvantages that our imperial system has imposed upon it. But it might have made it possible.

And finally, this criminal and anti-democratic policy of the United States serves notice that capitalist reaction has become much more sophisticated—and more effective. It need not overthrow governments by force and violence as it did in Guatemala in the Fifties and as it tried at the Bay of Pigs in the Sixties. It can intervene through the economic mechanisms of the world market; it can help overthrow democracy silently, quietly.

For Americans there is one crucial moral in all of this: we must join together to change this country so that it will never again play such a role.

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Address by Michael Harrington

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Democrats...
(Continued from page 1)
worked hard for McGovern) overwhelmingly supported affirmative action, open Party processes and strong enforcement of delegate selection rules. If the reports are accurate and the labor consensus on delegate selection holds, then the Party and the Democratic National Committee may be spared a long and bitter faction fight which now threatens to end up in court.

The problem is that everyone seems so used to fighting that, agreement or no agreement, reformers and regulars may continue to battle out of sheer habit.

There is little else in the way of explanation for Barkan's behavior at the Commission meeting. Despite an agenda which was utterly routine, the COPE director managed to inspire at least two major fights: on the size of the Commission and on the creation of a drafting committee to draw up recommendations for the Commission's consideration. On both points, Barkan had hopes that his kind of people (i.e. not the hated "New Politics" types) would have increased influence. If the Commission had doubled in size (as Barkan proposed), the seventy-seven new members would have been picked by Democratic National Chairman Robert Strauss, a close ally of Barkan's on most issues. Strauss refused to push on that proposal, and it died. And Barkan was right again that delaying or killing the creation of a seventeen member drafting commission would strengthen his hand. The Barkan forces, the labor regulars, are much stronger on the Commission (despite their cries that it is unrepresentative) than they will be on a subcommittee of the Commission, whose membership will be influenced by Chairwoman Mikulski.

But neither factional ploy makes any sense if Barkan has already accepted (however reluctantly) the basic demands of the reformers on openness of the Party, affirmative action, etc. Even if Barkan has accepted only a compromise version of the reform demands, which it seems certain that he has, it is puzzling why he is pushing so vehemently against the Mikulski Commission majority.

Despite charges by Barkan and Strauss, and articles in the daily press, that the Mikulski Commission is controlled by the reform "extremists;" the Delegate Selection Commission is, in fact, a rather pragmatic and moderate body. The seventeen member drafting committee, contrary to Washington Post reports about its lopsided reform majority, is a carefully chosen group which reflects not only the membership of the Commission but probably is as representative of the general Party as any committee that size can be. The breakdown of 11 "reformers" and six "regulars" which appeared in the Times and the Post is extremely misleading. One labor leader noted ruefully that the breakdown was based on who was close to Barkan and who was not. Using that classification, Bill duChessi, a co-chairman of New York Labor for McGovern, is lumped with the "regulars" while Blair Lee, the conservative lieutenant governor of Maryland, is counted with the "reformers."

A more careful breakdown of the drafting committee would list five liberals, five conservatives and seven moderates. In terms of Presidential preference before the last Convention: one member of the committee favored George Wallace; five favored Hubert Humphrey; five favored Edmund Muskie; three favored George McGovern; one favored Henry Jackson; and two were uncommitted up to the time of the Convention. Hardly an extremist group.

The drafting committee seems likely to bring in a report which the overwhelming majority of the Commission can accept. What then? According to rulings handed down during the Commission meeting, the recommendations would then go to the entire Democratic National Committee for approval. And Strauss claims that there is no requirement to follow the mandates of the 1972 Convention on delegate selection. Reformers (who, for the most part believe that the Commission's work should be reviewed only by the Convention) counter that if the DNC overrides the decisions of the Commission and ignores the Convention mandate, there will be a court battle over delegate selection rules.

After the COPE forces lost the fight to delay the appointment of the drafting committee, Strauss sought a legal ruling from Newton Minnow, former chairman of the Federal Communications Commission. Minnow, who holds no Party title, ruled that the Commission's work is subject to review by the full DNC. Sheldon S. Cohen, official counsel for the National Committee, later concurred with Minnow's opinion. Mikulski immediately began the search for a differing legal ruling. She's hoping that another lawyer will save the Commission from DNC review. She'll probably fail in her search.

But the important question is not whether the Commission's work is reviewed, but how. If the anti-Mikulski elements around COPE can stage a successful faction fight against the report, then the Democrats will be seeing each other in court. Reports that COPE has softened its line on reform are very good news in that context. But even if Barkan decides to put up a fight, he'll need the strong support of Chairman Strauss to win. And Evans and Novak bring us good news there: the semi-official columnists for the Coalition for a Democratic Majority are worried that Strauss is giving in too much to the reformers.

Newsletter of
THE DEMOCRATIC LEFT
Michael Harrington, Editor
Jack Clark, Managing Editor
The following people helped to put out this issue: Dave Bensman, Henry Bayer, Gretchen Donart, David Gaborman, Tom Kramer, David Kusnet, Jon Ratner, Ronnie Steinberg Ratner, Mark Schaeffer, Nancy Shier.
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LIFE ON THE LEFT

Jimmy Higgins Reports...

FORGING AHEAD OF THE TIMES. The New York Times, the “newspaper of record,” broke what may turn into the biggest labor story of the year quite prematurely. In a page one story on September 14, veteran labor correspondent Philip Shabecoff reported that “a spreading rank-and-file revolt is threatening the no-strike labor contract” in the steel industry. Although admitting that the 2000 steelworkers who signed the rank-and-file caucus’ letter of protest to the International represented only a small fraction of the 1.2 million member United Steel Workers, Shabecoff indicated that the signers represented more than their numbers and were situated in key steel producing areas. Some checks around the country indicate that Shabecoff exaggerated their strength:

- In Pittsburgh, the caucus simply does not function. One militant shop steward told the Newsletter that local newspaper reports of caucus activity in Youngstown and Chicago were the first indication he had seen of any rank-and-file revolt.
- In the Chicago-Gary area, a hotbed of caucus activity according to Shabecoff, the insurgents are fairly isolated and don’t pose a major threat to the no-strike agreement.
- In Youngstown, Ohio, the rank-and-file caucus seems better organized, but even there it is in a clearly insurgent position.

In all three areas, the insurgents have great potential. A union shop steward in a large Pittsburgh plant opined, “The average steelworker has no use for this no-strike agreement.” But the fate of the no-strike clause seems to ride on the next contract. If the wages and fringe benefits go up considerably without either a strike or a threat of a strike, there will probably be little rank-and-file pressure to do away with the no-strike agreement (although the members still might not like it), but if it’s a hard bargaining season and the industry uses the agreement to keep labor costs down, then I. W. Abel could be under strong pressure to abandon the experimental agreement not to strike. Perhaps Phil Shabecoff was just ahead of the times.

A FULL SCALE FEUD is brewing in the Illinois Democratic Party. “Walking Dan” Walker is setting out after Chicago Mayor Richard Daley and the state’s regular Democratic organization. Daley has no love for Walker who won the 1972 Gubernatorial primary by running against the machine. Walker resents what he sees as the Daley organization’s intent to thwart him in the state legislature. And in national Democratic councils, the Mayor is more sought after than the Governor which further fuels Walker’s resentment. So, Walker is planning to take on Daley on the latter’s home turf. The Governor has been raising lots of money lately, and it’s the worst kept secret in Springfield that Walker’s war chest is going to support anti-Daley candidates for the legislature and for offices in Cook County government. Walker, once lionized by the state’s liberal forces, has decided to look to more traditional conservative support as he has moved to “get the welfare chiselers,” cut taxes (rather than raising social spending or reforming the tax system) and reinstate the death penalty.

WHY DO WE SPEND SO MUCH MONEY? A very good question and the title of a new booklet by Popular Economics Press. In 47 well illustrated and highly readable pages, the authors (Nancy Brigham and Steve Babson) look at the costs of food, housing, transportation and utilities. There are good sections on government regulation and the role (or lack of a role) of wages in causing inflation. Copies are available for ninety cents from Popular Economics Press, 5A Putnam Ave., Somerville, Mass.

THE WASHINGTON RUMOR MILL has it that Nixon’s son-in-law, Edward Cox, is planning to challenge Massachusetts Congressman (Rev.) Robert Drinan. Drinan, one of the most liberal members of the House and sponsor of an impeach Nixon resolution, reportedly views the prospect with delight.